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Abstract 
In this research we investigate the behavior of noise traders and their impact on the 
market. We do this in an experimental market setting that allows us to determine not only 
how noise traders fare in a competitive asset market with other traders, but also how the 
equilibrium changes if a securities transactions tax (“Tobin tax”) is imposed. We find that 
noise traders lose money on average: they do not engage in extensive liquidity provision, 
and their attempt to make money by trend chasing is unsuccessful as they lose most in 
securities whose prices experience large moves. Noise traders adversely affect the 
informational efficiency of the market: they drive prices away from fundamental values, 
and the further away the market gets from the true value, the stronger this effect becomes. 
With a securities transaction tax, noise traders submit fewer orders and lose less money in 
those securities that exhibit large price movements. The tax is associated with a decrease 
in market trading volume, but informational efficiency remains essentially unchanged 
and liquidity (as measured by the price impact of trades) actually improves.  We find no 
significant effect, however, on market volatility, suggesting that at least this rationale for 
a securities transaction tax is not supported by our data.   
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The Limits of Noise Trading: An Experimental Analysis 
 
Noise traders play a ubiquitous role in the finance literature.  Fischer Black [1986] 
dedicated his AFA presidential address to the beneficial effects of “noise” on markets, 
concluding that “noise trading is essential to the existence of liquid markets.” Shleifer 
and Summers [1990] and Shleifer and Vishny [1997] identified noise traders as the basis 
for the limits of arbitrage, arguing that noise trading introduces risks that inhibit 
arbitrageurs and prevent prices from converging to fundamental asset values.  Noise 
traders in the guise of SOES bandits have been credited with enhancing price discovery 
(see Harris and Schultz [1998]), while their day trading counterparts have been 
disparaged for creating speculative bubbles in asset prices both home and abroad 
(Scheinkman and Xiong [2003]).  The excessive volatility allegedly arising from noise 
trading is also blamed for a variety of economic ills ranging from market crashes to the 
failure of globalization.1 
Despite this central importance, there remains considerable debate regarding the 
role of noise trading in financial markets.  For example, there is little agreement as to 
whether noise trading enhances or detracts from informational efficiency; whether noise 
trading increases or decreases price volatility; or even whether noise traders can survive 
in financial markets, in either the short or the long run.  This disagreement spills over into 
debates over whether society is well advised to limit noise trading by taxation or other 
means, or to ignore it altogether due to its inconsequential nature in affecting market 
outcomes. 
Undoubtedly, the confusion surrounding the role of noise traders stems in part 
from basic disagreements over even what constitutes noise trading.  Black, in his original 
                                                 
1 See, for example, “Day Trading Makes a Comeback” Reuters, December 19, 2004, where day traders 
“were blamed for adding irrationality to an exuberant market”.  Similarly, critics of globalization point to 
the excessive short-term speculation in foreign currency trading as undermining the economic viability of 
developing countries (discussion of this issue can be found at www.globalsolidarity.org). 
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discourse on the subject, was careful to distinguish between noise traders and traders 
transacting for informational or portfolio reasons.  He argued that “People who trade on 
noise are willing to trade even though from an objective point of view they would be 
better off not trading.  Perhaps they think the noise they are trading on is information.  Or 
perhaps they just like to trade.”2  Shleifer and Summers [1990] view noise traders as 
responding to “pseudo-signals that investors believe convey information about future 
returns but that would not convey such information in a fully rational model.”  These 
authors note, however, that “when [arbitrageurs] bet against noise traders, arbitrageurs 
begin to look like noise traders themselves.  They pick stocks instead of diversifying, 
because that is what betting against noise traders requires….It becomes hard to tell the 
noise traders from the arbitrageurs.”  And so, too, does it become difficult to discern the 
specific effects of noise traders from the more general behaviors characteristic of 
functioning markets. 
In this research we seek to clarify these issues by investigating the behavior of 
noise traders and their impact on the market.  We do this in an experimental market 
setting that allows us to determine not only how noise traders fare in a competitive asset 
market with other traders, but also how the equilibrium changes if we impose restrictions, 
such as a securities transactions tax (STT) (“Tobin tax”) on the market.  Our 
experimental framework allows for traders to pursue a wide variety of strategies, and for 
market equilibria to exhibit a wide range of outcomes.  We analyze how noise traders 
behave in these markets, and how they prosper and fail as measured by trading profits 
and losses.  We also evaluate how noise trading affects market properties such as 
informational efficiency, volatility, and the losses and gains of other market participants.  
And we examine how individual traders and the market fare in the presence of a 
                                                 
2 For an excellent analysis of excessive trading volume see Odean [1999]. 
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transactions tax.  Taken together, our analysis allows us to delineate the limits of noise 
trading in asset markets. 
Experimental analysis seems particularly well suited for addressing this issue.  As 
noted earlier, there is an extensive theoretical literature on noise trading, but the 
complexity of evaluating numerous (potentially non-rational) trading strategies imposes 
limitations on even the most insightful analyses (see, for example, the papers of DSSW 
[1990; 1991] or the more recent work of Scheinkman and Xiong [2003]).  Similarly, there 
is a large empirical literature investigating the effects of particular trader types on 
markets (see, for example, Barber et. al. [2004]; Garvey and Murphy [2001]; Linnainmaa 
[2003]), but again the complexity of analyzing actual market data (when such data is 
even available) makes inference problematic.  Experimental markets hold out the dual 
benefits of flexibility and control; traders are free to choose whatever strategies they like, 
while confounding factors are held constant across different market settings.  This allows 
us to differentiate behaviors that are otherwise difficult to disentangle. 
Our analysis provides a number of important results, several of which we 
highlight here.  First, we find that noise traders drive prices away from fundamental 
values, and not towards them as is sometimes alleged. Two aspects of our findings here 
are particularly intriguing.  We find that trading periods in which noise traders are most 
active are associated with higher pricing errors.  And we find that the destabilizing effects 
of noise traders are greatest when prices are farther away from true values.  Thus, noise 
traders hinder market efficiency exactly when the market needs it most.  In the aftermath 
of the recent Nasdaq market crash, some have questioned the role played by small 
investors or day traders in contributing to the internet bubble.  Our results here provide 
some support for the notion that these noise traders contributed to the market’s 
inefficiency.  We find that the presence of noise traders is not beneficial to market 
efficiency, and the farther away the market gets from true value, the stronger this effect 
becomes.   
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Second, we find that noise traders lose money, and they incur substantially greater 
losses than do liquidity traders.  Because noise traders in our markets have neither an 
informational advantage nor a portfolio motive for trade, their trading behavior is best 
characterized as either liquidity provision or trend chasing.  We find little evidence of the 
former, with noise traders instead generally taking rather than making liquidity. 
Unfortunately, the trend chasing strategy is not successful.  We find these traders lose 
relatively little when prices are close to true values, but they suffer massive losses when 
new information takes on extreme values. This pattern allows noise traders to 
occasionally make small profits but ultimately to suffer even greater losses.   Numerous 
authors have investigated whether day traders make profits in actual markets.  Although 
the results of specific studies differ, our results are close to those of Barber, Lee, Liu and 
Odean [2004] who find substantial losses associated with day trading in Taiwan, where 
average daily losses are more than twice the size of average daily gains.   
Our results here are also relevant for the debate over the survival of noise traders 
in financial markets.  Friedman [1953] first argued that wealth dynamics would 
ultimately drive noise traders from markets, and a large literature has expanded on this 
idea (see DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman (DSSW) [1991]; Blume and Easley 
[1992; 2002]; Shefrin and Statman [1994]; Sciubba [1999]; Sandroni [2000]).  DSSW 
offer the counter view that the greater risk taken on by noise traders could permit survival 
given a positive risk-return trade-off.  Our results cast doubt on this conjecture: we find 
that noise traders do not prosper in markets because trend chasing strategies collapse in 
the presence of large market movements.  We also find some evidence that noise traders 
who lose money in a period then trade less in subsequent periods, consistent with their 
eventually being driven out of the market.  These results suggest that while noise trading 
may persist in actual markets it does so because of the arrival of new noise traders, and 
not because of the survival of older ones. 
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Third, we find some evidence that a higher level of noise trading is associated 
with higher price volatility.  The notion that short term speculation, presumably the 
hallmark of noise traders, creates excess volatility in financial markets has long been 
debated.  Many countries impose a Securities Transactions Tax (STT) in order to curb 
such speculation, and several times over the past two decades such a tax has been 
proposed in the U.S. as well. While the costs and benefits of the STT have been 
extensively discussed in the literature (see Stiglitz [1989]; Summers and Summers 
[1989]; Amihud and Mendleson [1993]; Schwert and Seguin [1993]; Subrahmanyam 
[1990]) one problem with this discussion is the scarcity of empirical evidence on the 
effects of imposing such a tax (see Umlauf [1993] on the effects of the STT in Sweden).   
In our experimental market we find that imposing the STT indeed affects trader 
behavior. With such a tax, noise traders submit fewer orders, and lose less money in those 
securities that exhibit large price movements.  Market trading volume falls, but 
informational efficiency remains essentially unchanged and liquidity (as measured by the 
price impact of trading) actually improves.  We find no significant effects, however, on 
market volatility, suggesting that at least this rationale for the STT is not supported by 
our data.  Overall, our findings support the notion that restricting noise trading does little 
harm to the market and may be useful if the effects on individual traders are considered.3 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section sets out the experimental 
design we use in this analysis.  In Section 3 we then present our results on the effects of 
noise traders in markets.  Our analysis examines whether noise traders make money by 
trading; whether noise traders help or hurt price discovery; and the relationship between 
noise trading and market properties such as informational efficiency and volatility. In 
Section 4 we introduce a Securities Transactions Tax into our experimental markets, and 
                                                 
3  The SEC moved to curb day trading in 2000 by requiring at least $25,000 to open a day trading account.  
This action stemmed from the 1999 incident in which a day trader killed his family and nine people at two 
brokerages in Atlanta after having sustained day trading losses of $150,000. 
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consider anew the issues of noise trader profits, price discovery, informational efficiency, 
and market volatility.  Section 5 then summarizes our results and offers conclusions on 
the role of noise traders in financial markets. 
 
2. Experimental Design 
 We now describe the nature of our experiment and the specific features of our 
markets. This section is based on Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar [2005], which uses very 
similar market structures.  As a useful preliminary, we note the following definitions. A 
cohort is a group of twelve traders who always trade together. Our experiment includes 
eight cohorts, for a total of 96 traders.  A security is a claim on a terminal dividend, and is 
identified by the distribution of information and liquidity targets (described below). A 
trading period is a 150-second interval during which traders can take trading actions for a 
specific security. Only one security is traded in each trading period. Each cohort of 
participants traded 24 securities sequentially (one in each trading period) over a 90-
minute session. Unless otherwise indicated, all prices, values and winnings are 
denominated in laboratory dollars ($), an artificial currency that is converted into US 
currency at the end of the experiment. 
 
2.1. Experimental Goals and Design 
The first goal of our experiment is to examine the behavior and welfare of noise 
traders. To achieve this goal, we construct markets with three types of traders.  Four 
traders (designated the informed traders) are given information about security value that 
is not given to the remaining traders.  Four other traders (the liquidity traders) do not 
know the true value, but are assigned trading targets they must achieve before the end of 
trading if they are to avoid a penalty described below.  Liquidity traders failing to meet 
their targets are assessed a penalty equal to $100 for each unfulfilled share. This penalty 
is large enough to make trading attractive to the liquidity traders, and once they hit their 
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targets, liquidity traders can buy or sell as many shares as they please without penalty.4 
The remaining four traders (the noise traders) have no information and no trading targets, 
and therefore have no reason to trade other than that they believe that they can interpret 
market information better than others, or that they can provide liquidity.5   
By creating three classes of traders, we can focus on how the behavior of noise 
traders differs from that of informed and liquidity traders.  This focus on differences 
allows us to draw clearer inferences about noise trader behavior, because we can use the 
other types of traders as control groups in our analyses.  
One possible concern in any study of noise traders is that traders with no 
information or liquidity targets may trade simply because they feel they have nothing 
better to do with their time.  Because this could be viewed as the definition of a noise 
trader, we do not view this as a problem.  However, simply observing a baseline level of 
noise trade would shed little light on the forces that drive such trade and the cost-benefit 
analyses that influence noise traders’ decisions.  Consequently, to examine the conditions 
that influence noise trader behavior and how noise traders affect the market, we also 
manipulate security value realizations and aggregate liquidity demand.   
Specifically, security value realizations are structured as follows.  Each security 
pays a liquidating dividend equal to 50 plus the sum of two random numbers, each of 
which is uniformly distributed from -25 to 25.  Two informed traders learn the value of 
the first random number before trading begins while the other two informed traders learn 
the value of the second random number (so that no trader has perfect information). We 
categorize securities as high-extremity if they have values below 35 or above 65; we 
categorize securities as low-extremity if they have values between 36 and 64. We allow 
                                                 
4 The use of trading targets is standard in experimental work (see, for example, Lamoreaux and Schnitzlein 
[1997], Cason [2000], Bloomfield and O’Hara [1998; 2000] and Bloomfield, O’Hara and Saar [2005]), and 
it captures the notion that liquidity traders are transacting for exogenous reasons relating to the need to 
invest or the need to liquidate positions. 
5 Each trader knows his or her type, and each knows the populations of informed, liquidity, and noise 
traders in the market.  Traders do not know, however, the roles played by specific participants in the 
experiment. 
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noise traders the opportunity to earn profits by providing liquidity. For that purpose, we 
set the targets of the liquidity traders such that the aggregate number of shares they 
demand is positive, zero, or negative in different securities.6  
Our second goal is to understand the market influence of noise traders.  This goal 
presents a challenge in experimental design.   Ideally, one could exploit the advantages of 
the experimental method by comparing markets that are identical in every way, except for 
the presence of noise traders.  However, for markets of finite size, such controls are not 
possible:  a market with noise traders must either have more total traders or fewer traders 
of other types than a market without noise traders.  To avoid this problem, we use two 
different techniques.  First, we use a variety of measured independent variables, such as 
number of trades involving noise traders.  Unlike manipulated independent variables, 
which are under the complete control of the experimenter, measured independent 
variables are determined by participant behavior.  As a result, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that associations between market behavior and noise trader behavior are 
driven by variables that we do not observe, but that are associated with both the 
dependent and independent variables (similar to the situation in empirical work). 
To minimize the risk of this ‘correlated omitted variables’ problem that arises 
from the use of measured independent variables, we also use a controlled manipulation to 
assess the influence of noise traders:  the Securities Transaction Tax (SST).  In a Tax 
setting, we impose a $2 fee for each trade.  In a no-tax setting, there are no transaction 
costs.  We expect the SST to substantially reduce the propensity of noise traders to trade, 
because the benefits to doing so are made substantially smaller. The direct effect of the 
tax on the behavior of the informed and liquidity traders is less obvious: informed traders 
                                                 
6 For 8 securities, half of the liquidity traders must buy 20 shares and the other half must sell 30 shares, for 
an aggregate liquidity demand of −20.  For another 8 securities, half of the liquidity traders must sell 20 
shares, while the other half must buy 30 shares, for an aggregate liquidity demand of +20.  The remaining 
eight securities have zero aggregate liquidity trader demand:  For 4 of those securities, half of the traders 
must buy 20 shares and the other half must sell 20 shares; for the other 4 securities, half of the traders must 
buy 30 shares, and the other half must sell 30 shares. 
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have valuable information to trade on, and liquidity traders suffer substantial penalties for 
failing to meet their trading targets.  In addition to clarifying the influence of noise 
traders, the SST manipulation also allows us to speak to the policy issues associated with 
such taxes. 
 
2.2. Experimental Controls 
To ensure that we can draw clear inferences from treatment differences, we 
created two groups of 12 securities, each containing four securities from each level of 
aggregate liquidity demand.  Within each group, exactly half of the securities with each 
level of aggregate liquidity demand (−20, +20 and 0) have extreme value realizations, 
while the other half do not.  We balance the direction of the aggregate liquidity demand 
with the direction of extreme value realizations, so that just as many securities with 
extremely positive (negative) values have positive aggregate liquidity demand as negative 
aggregate liquidity demand, and just as many securities with positive (negative) 
aggregate liquidity demand have extremely positive values as negative values.  All of the 
cohorts traded both groups of twelve securities in the same order; however, half of the 
cohorts traded the first group with an SST and the second group without one, while the 
other half of the cohorts traded the first group without an SST and the second group with 
one.    
 In summary, our experiment is a fully factorial repeated-measures design in which 
each variable is perfectly balanced for order of presentation and for other treatments.  
Specifically, the design includes trader type (informed, liquidity, noise), SST (present, 
absent), extremity (high, low), cohort (eight cohorts of twelve traders each), trading order 
(SST first, SST last), and aggregate liquidity demand (−20, +20 and 0).7 Trader type and 
cohort membership are manipulated across traders, and all other factors are manipulated 
                                                 
7 Analysis of results by trading order (STT first, STT last) did not produce any significant patterns, and 
therefore we do not discuss it further in the paper. 
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within traders. We count on the random assignment of participants to trader types to 
minimize the possibility that differences across trader types are driven by individual 
differences.   
 
2.3. Trading 
Our double auction market is organized like a typical electronic limit order book 
with strict price/time priority (older limit orders in the book at each price level are 
executed first). During the 150 seconds of trading in each security, traders can enter bids 
(limit orders to buy one share at a chosen price) and asks (limit orders to sell one share at 
a chosen price). Traders can delete their orders at any time during the period. Traders can 
enter as many bids and asks as they wish, subject to two rules.  First, they cannot enter 
bids with prices that are equal to or more than the price of the best outstanding ask, or 
asks with prices that are equal to or less than the price of the best outstanding bid (so that 
they market is not “crossed” or “locked”). Second, all bids and asks must have integer 
prices between 0 and 100, inclusive. As soon as a trader enters an order, the order is 
shown on every trader’s computer screen, indicating that an unidentified trader is willing 
to buy or sell one more share at the posted price.8    
Traders may also take other traders’ bids and asks. Traders take an ask by clicking 
a “buy 1” button, which allows them to buy one share at the lowest current asking price. 
Traders take a bid by clicking a “sell 1” button, which allows them to sell one share at the 
highest current bid price. Taking an ask is equivalent to entering a market (or marketable 
limit) buy order, while taking a bid is equivalent to entering a market (or marketable 
limit) sell order. All trades are reported immediately to all traders, indicating the price 
                                                 
8 A trader’s screen includes one chart indicating bids and one indicating asks. The left side of each chart 
shows every price at which an order has been posted (shown in green for the highest bid and lowest ask 
price, and yellow for other prices), and the number of shares posted at that price (shown by a number to the 
left of the graph). The right side of each chart shows every price at which the trader has personally posted 
an order, and the number of shares that the trader has posted at that price. The center of each chart also 
includes a solid red line indicating the highest bid or lowest ask entered by any trader, and a solid green line 
indicating the highest bid or lowest ask entered by that particular trader. 
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and the trade direction (whether the trade involved a market buy taking an ask or a 
market sell taking a bid). 
 
2.4. Subjects, Instructions and Incentives 
 The experiments were conducted in the Business Simulation Laboratory (BSL) at 
the Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University. The participants in 
the experiments were Johnson MBA students. Each experimental 90-minute session 
involved twelve participants (one cohort). Upon arriving at the BSL, each subject 
received detailed written instructions, a copy of which is given the Appendix. The 
instructions were reviewed in detail by the experiment administrator, who also answered 
any questions. The administrator then guided participants through the use and 
interpretation of the computer interface by trading a practice security, which was exactly 
like the securities to be traded during the experiment, except that trading outcomes did 
not affect participants’ cash winnings. 
Traders started trading in each security with an endowment of $0 in cash and zero 
shares. Unlimited negative cash and share balances were permitted, so traders could hold 
any inventory of shares they desired, including large short positions. Traders were told 
that at the end of trading, shares paid a liquidating dividend equal to their true value, so 
that their net trading gain or loss for a security would simply be equal to their ending 
share balance times the value of each share, plus their ending cash balance. Any penalties 
assessed to a liquidity trader for failing to hit a target are deducted from this trading gain 
or added to her trading loss. 
 We determined cash winnings by subtracting a “floor” from each trader’s 
winnings in laboratory dollars, and then multiplying by an exchange rate that converts 
laboratory dollars into US dollars. The floor and exchange rate were derived from pilot 
experiments separately for each type of trader, and were designed so that each type would 
receive average winnings of approximately $25 per 90-minute session (with an expected 
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minimum payment of $10.00). Traders were not told the floor or exchange rate, however, 
to minimize any gaming behavior.9 
 
2.5. Statistical Analysis 
We use two types of statistical methodologies in Sections 3 and 4: (i) a repeated-
measures ANOVA, and (ii) a regression (or VAR) analysis.  
From a statistical standpoint, the repeated-measures ANOVA is a conservative 
and robust procedure for analyzing experimental data. To judge statistical significance, 
we compute the average of the dependent variable within each cell (defined by the 
appropriate factors) for each of the eight cohorts. A repeated-measures analysis 
effectively treats each cohort as providing a single independent observation of the 
dependent variable.  This design therefore reduces the problem, common in experimental 
economics, of overstating statistical significance by assuming that repetitions of the same 
actions by the same subject or group of subjects are independent events.  
When appropriate, we will use the ANOVA terminology of "main effect," 
"interaction," and "simple effect" to describe the statistical tests. A main effect examines 
the influence of one factor averaging over all the levels of the other factors. An 
interaction is when the effect of one factor is different at different levels of the other 
factors. A simple effect looks at the influence of one factor holding another factor at a 
specific level.10 All the results we report in Figures 3 through 7 and Table 3 are based on 
                                                 
9 As trade progresses, traders may become aware that they are incurring trading losses.  Traders’ payoffs 
are based upon their trading performance, so poorer performance results in lower payments. One concern is 
that losing traders may take on excessive risk, a problem sometimes referred to as the “house money” 
effect. Excessive risk-taking in experiments can be curbed by subtracting trading losses from a “floor” to 
determine actual payoffs.  Because the floor level is unknown to traders, the actual level of their trading 
losses is also unknown, thereby reducing their tendency for overzealous trading. 
10 For example, a significant Tax main effect without a significant Type*Tax interaction means that the 
STT exerts a similar influence on the behavior of all trader types. A significant Type*Tax interaction 
implies that the different types of traders behave differently in the two tax regimes (with and without tax)  
with respect to the dependent variable under investigation. An example of simple effects is looking 
separately at the three types of traders to see whether Tax exerts a significant influence on the behavior of 
each type.  
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the ANOVA analysis. The ANOVA results are easy to recognize in the text of Sections 3 
and 4 because we provide the p-values associated with the different findings. 
  The second type of statistical procedure we use is a regression analysis. We use 
regressions to look at the relationships between market-wide measures of informational 
efficiency or volatility and the trading of informed and noise traders. The unit of 
observation for the regression analysis is a security (i.e., one trading period). Where 
appropriate, we investigate the effects of extremity levels or the tax regimes using 
dummy variables, and report the results of Chow tests for structural change as a means of 
assessing the significance of these manipulations. 
A possible concern with such an analysis is that regression errors for different 
trading periods of the same cohort of subjects may be correlated. To examine the 
robustness of our results, we use a methodology that is similar in spirit to the one in Fama 
and MacBeth [1973]. We run a separate regression for the 24 trading periods of each 
cohort. While the potentially correlated errors make the standard errors of the coefficients 
difficult to interpret, the coefficients themselves are still consistent. We then perform t-
tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the eight observations of each coefficient.  This 
approach allows us to draw inferences from across cohorts, which can be assumed 
independent. The regression results are presented in Tables 1, 2, and 4. 
In Section 4.5 (Table 5) we use a bivariate vector autoregression (VAR) to 
analyze the dynamic relation between noise traders’ profits and their trading intensity. 
The VAR is particularly suitable for analyzing the possibly related behavior of a trader 
over time in the different securities he or she trades. We use Granger-causality tests to 
make an inference on whether traders’ performance affects their future behavior.11   
 
 
                                                 
11 For a standard exposition of vector autoregressions see Hamilton [1994]. 
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3.  Noise Traders and their Effect on the Market 
The experimental framework detailed in the previous section is designed to 
investigate how noise traders affect the market. As a useful preliminary, we begin with 
summary statistics to provide a sense of the behavior of the market and the orders 
initiated by the traders. We then look at whether noise traders make money by trading. 
We proceed to examine whether noise traders help or hurt value discovery, and the 
relationship between noise trading and market-wide measures of informational efficiency 
and volatility. Discussing the effects of a securities transaction tax (STT) on the market is 
deferred to Section 4.12 
 
3.1.  Summary Statistics 
Figure 1 presents the evolution over time of volume and bid-ask spreads in our 
markets. Each panel divides the trading period in a security into ten 15-second intervals. 
Since trading starts when the book is empty, no executions can take place before there are 
limit orders in the book. Therefore, traders tend to submit more limit orders in the first 
15-second interval and as a result executed trade volume is lower. Panel A shows that 
volume increases markedly in the second interval, and from that point volume exhibits 
the usual “U” shape observed in equity markets. Panel B shows that bid-ask spreads also 
follow the “U” shape over time that is prevalent in equity markets and experimental 
studies (see, for example, Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar [2005]). 
Figure 2 provides information on the orders submitted by traders. Panel A shows 
that all three trader types (noise, informed, and liquidity) use both market and limit 
                                                 
12 The manner in which we report our results—first in Section 3 on noise traders’ behavior and impact on 
the market and then in Section 4 on the effects of the securities transaction tax—is for expositional 
simplicity. The results we present in Section 3 are based on data gathered from trading periods with and 
without taxes. What enables us to postpone the discussion of taxes is that there are no statistically 
significant higher-level interactions of trader type, extremity, and taxes in the ANOVA analysis except for 
profits. As for profits, the directional effect of taxes on noise traders and informed traders is the same (just 
the magnitude of the effects differs across the tax regimes), and therefore we can still draw clear inferences 
even before discussing taxes. Table 3 contains a complete breakdown of profits by trader type, extremity 
level, and tax regime. 
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orders. This evidence suggests that experimental subjects understood the market 
mechanism and felt comfortable pursuing various order strategies. Panel B shows the 
average number of trades by the three types of traders and their breakdown into market 
and executed limit orders. Liquidity traders trade the most (44.8 shares), followed by 
informed traders (43.2 shares), and noise traders (32.2 shares).   
The heavy trading by the liquidity traders is understandable given their 
exogenously imposed portfolio targets.  Similarly, because informed traders have private 
information, their trading activity is a natural consequence of their efforts to profit from 
their informational advantage.  Noise traders are given no targets or special information, 
but they, too, seem to trade a significant number of shares.  We provide no specific 
motivation for this behavior, but note that it could be consistent with a wide variety of 
arguments advanced in the literature such as overconfidence, trend-chasing, liquidity 
provision, or simply liking to trade.  To evaluate this issue further, we now turn to 
analyzing the trading behavior of noise traders. 
 
3.2.  Trading Profits 
The standard result in the theoretical market microstructure literature is that 
informed traders make money and liquidity traders lose money. This is also the case here. 
The average trading profit of an informed trader is 142.17 experimental dollars 
(henceforth, dollars), while a liquidity trader loses on average 61.04 dollars.13  
Less obvious is the question of whether noise traders can make money. Black 
[1986] posits that most of the time noise traders as a group will lose money. As noted 
earlier, the literature on day trading is mixed on whether day traders, who can be viewed 
as one type of noise traders, make or lose money on average. Harris and Schultz [1998] 
                                                 
13 These numbers represent trading profits before any payment of taxes. The pattern of profits net of taxes 
across trader types is similar to that presented here. Section 4 looks in detail at the effect of security 
transaction taxes on traders’ profits. 
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show that SOES bandits (individual investors who used Nasdaq’s Small Order Execution 
System for day trading) make money on average. They typically attempt to capitalize on 
short-term momentum in prices and hold a position for only a few minutes. Linnainmaa 
[2003] looks at day traders in Finland and finds that their performance is not different 
from that of a control group comprised on non-day-traders. Interestingly, day traders in 
her sample are net suppliers of liquidity in that they use limit orders and therefore often 
function as if they were market makers. Jordan and Diltz [2003] and Barber, Lee, Liu, 
and Odean [2004] find that day traders lose money on average.  
The experimental design does not “force” noise traders to lose money. Because 
there is private information in the market, if noise traders are good at identifying price 
trends, they could make money by trading on these trends like Harris and Schultz 
[1998]’s SOES bandits.  The experimental design also features imbalances in the buy and 
sell targets of the liquidity traders, so noise traders can presumably make money by 
supplying liquidity as in Linnainmaa [2003], smoothing out demand fluctuations and 
getting compensated for making the market.  
The evidence in the experiment is that noise traders realize trading losses, 81.13 
dollars per trader on average, that are even greater than those of the liquidity traders who 
have to trade. In fact, the more noise traders trade, the more money they are likely to lose. 
The correlation between the trading profit of a noise trader in a trading period and the 
number of shares he or she trades across all trading periods and all cohorts in the 
experiment is −0.345 (with p < 0.0001 against the hypothesis of zero correlation).   This 
result is reminiscent of Odean’s [1999] findings that individual traders trade “too much”. 
Panel A of Figure 3 shows that there is an interesting pattern with respect to 
trading profit and the extremity of the realized value, which can be viewed as a (noisy) 
measure of the value of the private information that the informed traders posses (p = 
0.011 for the extremity*type interaction). Noise traders lose relatively little (12.08 
dollars) when the realized value of the security is not too far from the expected value. 
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However, they lose a lot of money (150.18 dollar) when the realized value is far from the 
expected value (the difference in the noise trader’s losses is statistically significant, p =  
0.0162). Informed traders, not surprisingly, make much more money when their 
information is valuable, 218.55 dollars, than when their information is less valuable, 
65.79 dollars. Liquidity traders lose about the same in both cases (53.71 and 68.37). 
That extremity has little effect on liquidity traders’ losses while greatly affecting 
noise traders’ losses suggests that noise traders are unable to trade profitably on price 
trends. In fact, they seem to behave like the “mistaken” investors hypothesized by 
Friedman [1953] who buy high and sell low, or the day traders in Jordan and Diltz [2003] 
and Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean [2004]. 
We also examine whether noise traders attempt to make money by adopting the 
role of liquidity providers as in Linnainmaa [2003]. Panel B of Figure 3 shows how much 
depth trader types contribute to the best bid or offer prices (BBO).14 Informed traders are 
much less likely to provide depth when the value of their information is high, consistent 
with the findings of Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar [2005]. Noise traders supply about the 
same level of liquidity irrespective of the level of extremity (0.66 and 0.65), and this level 
is much lower than that of either informed or liquidity traders.  Thus, noise traders play a 
very minor role in liquidity provision, and focus instead of trend chasing, a strategy that 
is not particularly successful.  
 
3.3.  Value Discovery and Informational Efficiency 
Black [1986] states that noise trading “actually puts noise into the prices”, and 
concerns that excessive speculation can drive prices away from fundamental values are 
mentioned in Summers and Summers [1989] and Schwert and Seguin [1993]. An 
                                                 
14 We take snapshots of the contribution to depth at the BBO of all trader types each time a trader submits 
or cancels an order. The average contribution to BBO depth of a trader of a certain type is computed as the 
simple average of these snapshots divided by the number of traders of each type.  
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experimental methodology is particularly suitable for examining this issue because we 
know the fundamental value of each security and we are also able to directly observe the 
trading of noise traders. In the analysis which follows, we first develop measures that 
quantify the contribution of a trader type to value discovery, or whether their trades move 
prices closer to or away from the true value. We then look at market-wide measures of 
informational efficiency (pricing errors), and use regression analysis to relate those to the 
magnitude of noise trading and informed trading in the market. 
To examine the contribution of each trader type to value discovery (or the 
adjustment of prices toward the true value of the security) we construct two measures. 
For Measure A, we sort executed orders into those moving prices toward the true value or 
away from it.  In particular, if the true value is higher than the price, we assign +1 to a 
buy order of a trader that resulted in a trade and −1 to a sell order that resulted in a trade.  
If the true value is lower than the price, we assign −1 (+1) to a buy (sell) order of a trader 
that resulted in a trade. The measure is then aggregated for all market and executed limit 
orders of a trader and divided by the number of his trades.  
Measure A therefore has the following properties. First, it is always in the range 
[−1, +1]. If a trader always buys when the price is below the value and sells when the 
price is above the value, he is helping price discovery and will have measure A = +1. If 
he is always hindering price discovery by buying when the price is above the true value 
of the security and selling when it is below the value, he will have measure A = −1. The 
more positive (negative) measure A of a trader, the more his trades contribute to 
(interfere with) value discovery.15 Measure B of value discovery is constructed in a 
similar way to measure A, except that we consider only trades resulting from market 
                                                 
15 We computed two versions of this measure: One using all orders that resulted in a trade, and one that 
excludes trades that occur when the true value if within the bid-ask spread. The results were similar for the 
two measures, but since the logic behind the measure is less robust when the true value is within the spread, 
we present the results of the second version.   
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orders submitted by the trader. Therefore, it considers contribution to or interference with 
value discovery only for the “active” side of a trade. 
Panel A of Figure 4 shows that the different types of traders affect value 
discovery in a different way (p < 0.0001). As one might expect, the trades of informed 
traders help prices adjust to the true value: their measure A is equal to 0.23 and measure 
B is equal to 0.12. If noise traders help price discovery by making price adjust faster as 
some have claimed in the controversy over the trading of SOES bandits (e.g., Battalio, 
Hatch, and Jennings [1997]), then the value discovery measures of the noise traders 
should also be positive. We find the opposite: both measures A and B are negative for 
noise traders (−0.08 and −0.15, respectively), echoing the notion in Black [1986] or the 
concerns in Summers and Summers [1989] that noise traders are driving prices away 
from fundamental values. 
There is also a statistically significant interaction between trader type and 
extremity for measure A (p = 0.0029). As Panel B of Figure 4 shows, when the realized 
value of the security is close to expected value, the value discovery measure of the noise 
traders is negative, but close to zero (−0.02) which means that their trading is more 
neutral with respect to value discovery. On the other hand, when the realized value is 
further away from the expected value of the security, or when the private information of 
the informed traders is more valuable, measure A is equal to −0.13. This means that 
exactly when prices are in greater need for informational efficiency, when they are 
further away from the true value and there is valuable private information in the market, 
noise traders hinder rather than help the adjustment of prices to their full-information 
level. 
Our second analysis relates the average level of informational efficiency in the 
market to the levels of noise trading and informed trading. For each trading period, we 
compute the measure DEVP as the average of the distance of the transaction price from 
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the true value (pricing error).16 We also record all trades of the noise traders (the sum of 
their market orders and executed limit orders), and similarly for the informed traders. We 
then run the following OLS regression:  
DEVPi = a + b * NOISETRDi + c * INFTRDi + Errori 
where NOISETRD are the trades of the noise traders, INFTRD are the trades of the 
informed traders, and the subscript i denotes all trading periods pooled across the eight 
cohorts. We also run a similar regression for another pricing error measure that is not 
influenced by the magnitude of the bid-ask spread, DEVMID. This measure is computed 
by averaging the distance of the true value form the midpoint between the prevailing bid 
and the ask prices when a trade takes place. 
   Panel A of Table 1 presents the results of the two regressions. The coefficient 
on NOISETRD is positive and highly statistically significant in both regressions. This 
means that trading periods in which noise trading is higher (holding constant the amount 
of informed trading) are associated with higher pricing errors or lower informational 
efficiency. In contrast, the coefficient on INFTRD is negative and highly statistically 
significant in both regressions. This means that a higher amount of informed trading is 
associated with lower pricing errors or higher informational efficiency. This negative 
coefficient is consistent with informed traders putting new information into prices, 
thereby helping prices adjust to their full-information level. The results suggest, however, 
that noise traders in fact slow down the adjustment of prices or introduce noise into 
prices.17 
A potential econometric problem with the above specification is that the 
regression errors for different trading periods of the same cohort of subjects may be 
                                                 
16 A trading period constitutes two and a half minutes of trading in which one security is traded before its 
dividend is publicly revealed and gains and losses are realized. 
17 We also ran slightly different models to see if the results are sensitive to the manner in which we control 
for the level of trading. We ran univariate and multivariate regressions where we normalized NOISETRD 
and INFTRD by total volume and the results were similar in the sense that noise trading had a positive and 
significant coefficient and informed trading had a negative and significant coefficient.  
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correlated. We examine the robustness of our results using the following procedure: (i) 
we run a separate regression for the 24 trading periods of each cohort, and (ii) we then 
perform t-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the eight observations of each 
coefficient. The regression coefficients from each cohort are consistent even in the 
presence of this econometric problem, and using their (cross-cohort) variability allows us 
to construct tests using eight observations that can be assumed independent.  
Panel B of Table 1 provides the means and medians of the coefficients on 
NOISETRD and INFTRD together with the associated p-values for the tests. In both 
models with DEVP and DEVMID, the mean and median of the NOISETRD coefficients 
are positive and statistically significant, while the mean and median coefficients on 
INFTRD are negative and statistically significant. These results support our conclusion 
from the pooled regressions on the effects of noise and informed trading on informational 
efficiency. 
Like the value discovery measures, the analysis of pricing errors also exhibits an 
interesting interaction with the extremity manipulation. To investigate this interaction we 
introduce a dummy variable that is equal to zero for low extremity securities and one for 
high extremity securities. Panel C of Table 1 shows the regressions on DEVP and 
DEVMID in a full dummy variable format (without an intercept) to look separately at the 
effects of low and high value extremity on the relation between the informational 
efficiency measures and both NOISETRD and INFTRD. We also use a structural stability 
test to investigate the question of whether the relation between informational efficiency 
and trading is the same across the two subsamples of securities (low and high extremity). 
We observe that informed traders are most helpful in lowering pricing errors 
when the value of their information is higher. In fact, the negative coefficient on INFTRD 
is not statistically different from zero in the low extremity subsample, but it is highly 
statistically significant in the high extremity subsample. Noise trading seems to be 
associated with higher pricing errors mainly in the low extremity case. Chow tests for 
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structural stability performed on both regressions reject the null hypothesis of no 
structural change (in both cases with p < 0.0001).18 
 
3.4.  Volatility 
The limits-to-arbitrage literature claims that noise trading could increase the 
volatility or risk associated with financial securities (e.g., De Long, Shleifer, Summers, 
and Waldmann [1990] and Shleifer and Summers [1990]). Black [1986] also states that 
“anything that changes the amount or character of noise trading will change the volatility 
of prices” (p. 533). Reducing the “excess” volatility of prices is also one of the arguments 
mentioned in favor of a securities transaction tax (e.g., Summers and Summers [1989], 
Schwert and Seguin [1993]). The empirical literature on day trading finds mixed results, 
however, on whether noise trading causes subsequent volatility. Lynch-Koski, Rice, and 
Tarhouni [2004] use a vector autoregression and find that noise trading (which they 
proxy by activity on message boards followed by day traders) increases volatility in the 
following day. Battalio, Hatch, and Jennings [1997] use a different proxy (trading on 
Nasdaq’s Small Order Execution System) and find higher volatility in the one-minute 
interval immediately following 1000-share transactions on SOES, but lower volatility 
over longer periods. 
We compute two measures of price volatility in our experimental markets. The 
first measure is the standard deviation of transaction prices in a trading period (STDP), 
and the second measure is the price range (high minus low) in a trading period 
(PRANGE).19  Our analysis relating volatility to noise trading is similar to the one we 
                                                 
18 The Chow test looks at the stability of the estimated relation over two subsamples: low and high 
extremity. The log likelihood ratio statistic is based on the comparison of the restricted and unrestricted 
maximum of the log likelihood function. Both the restricted and unrestricted log likelihood numbers are 
obtained by estimating the regression using the whole sample. The restricted regression uses the original set 
of regressors (intercept, NOISETRD, and INFTRD), while the unrestricted regression adds a dummy 
variable for each high extremity security.  
 
19 The daily price range is a measure of volatility that seems particularly relevant to day trading (e.g., 
Bernstein [1998]). 
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perform for the market-wide measures of informational efficiency in Section 3.3. For 
each trading period we compute STDP and PRANGE and record the levels of noise 
trading (NOISETRD) and informed trading (INFTRD). We then run OLS regressions of 
each volatility measure on the trading variables.  
Panel A of Table 2 presents the results of the two regressions. The coefficient on 
NOISETRD in the regression on STDP is positive (0.0258) and statistically significant. 
Thus, trading periods in which noise trading is higher (holding constant the amount of 
informed trading) are associated with higher volatility of prices. A similar positive and 
highly statistically significant coefficient on noise trading is found in the regression on 
PRANGE. The coefficient on informed trading, INFTRD, is negative but not statistically 
significant in either regression. 
Correlated errors may again be a concern, so we run separate regressions for each 
cohort and conduct tests on the coefficients from these regressions. Panel B of Table 2 
reports the means and medians of the coefficients on NOISETRD and INFTRD together 
with the associated p-values for the tests. None of the tests show statistically significant 
results. While it is true that these tests utilize only eight observations (one for each 
cohort) and therefore constitute a rather high hurdle for finding statistical significance, 
the results in this panel caution us against interpreting too strongly the significant results 
in the pooled regressions.  
In Panel C of Table 2 we look at how trading affects volatility separately in the 
two extremity levels. We use a dummy variable that is equal to zero for low extremity 
securities and one for high extremity securities, and present the two regression models in 
a full dummy variable format (without an intercept). We observe that neither noise nor 
informed trading seem to affect volatility in low extremity securities. On the other hand, 
noise trading has a positive coefficient and is highly statistically significant in both the 
STDP and PRANGE regressions for high extremity securities. This means that when 
prices are further from expected values, higher levels of noise trading are associated with 
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higher volatility. This finding seems to suggest that noise traders would exacerbate 
volatility in times of market stress. The coefficient on informed trading is negative in 
both regressions, but only in the regression on PRANGE is it statistically significant. We 
use Chow tests to look at the stability of the estimated relation over the two subsamples 
(low and high extremity). The tests performed on both regressions reject the null 
hypothesis of no structural change (with p < 0.0001 for STDP and p = 0.0019 for 
PRANGE). 
Due to the lack of significance of the robustness tests in Panel B of Table 2, 
however, one should interpret the results of the pooled regressions with the dummy 
variables for extremity with caution. While greater noise trading seems to be associated 
with higher volatility at times when prices move a lot (and controlling for the trading of 
the informed traders who move the prices), these results cannot be viewed as a strong 
support for the notion that noise traders cause “excess” volatility. 
 
4.  Noise Trading and a Securities Transaction Tax 
In the previous section we presented evidence that more noise trading is 
associated with lower informational efficiency of prices, and perhaps (though the 
evidence is weak) also with greater volatility. Curbing noise trading could therefore help 
make prices better reflect the fundamental values of securities, thereby improving risk 
sharing and the allocation of investment. Since there is no easy way outside of an 
experimental setting to identify noise traders, one way to reduce noise trading that was 
suggested in the past is a securities transaction tax (see Tobin [1978], Stiglitz [1989], and 
Summers and Summers [1989]).20  
Proponents of the tax claim that it will reduce stock market volatility and improve 
the efficiency of prices without harming liquidity. The intuition for why this would occur 
                                                 
20 For a recent list of countries that impose a securities transaction tax see Pollin, Baker, and Schaberg 
[2002].  
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is articulated by Stiglitz [1989] who describes a world populated by informed investors, 
uninformed investors, and noise traders, very much like the one we constructed in the 
experiment. He conjectures that the tax is unlikely to discourage trading by the 
uninformed and informed traders, and therefore its effect will mainly be to drive out the 
noise traders. A survey of arguments on the potential costs and benefits of a securities 
transaction tax can be found in Schwert and Seguin [1993] and Pollin, Baker, and 
Schaberg [2002].21 Our ability to see who is trading in our experimental markets enables 
us to test Stiglitz’s conjecture, as well as to investigate the effect of the tax on volume, 
liquidity, informational efficiency, and volatility.22  
 
4.1.  Noise Traders’ Strategies and Profit 
The imposition of taxes affects noise traders’ strategies in terms of liquidity 
provision. Panel A of Figure 5 looks at the submission rate of limit orders defined as the 
number of limit orders divided by the total orders traders submit. The submission rate of 
limit orders by noise traders declines under the tax regime, from 0.71 without taxes to 
0.65 with taxes (p-value = 0.0792 for the tax*type interaction). With noise traders 
submitting fewer limit orders relative to market orders, they provide less liquidity to the 
market.  
                                                 
21 Two theoretical papers that examine the implications of securities transaction taxes are Subrahmanyam 
[1998] and Dow and Rahi [2000]. Subrahmanyam investigates a securities transaction tax in a model with 
asymmetrically informed traders (either strategic or competitive). In his framework, a transaction tax makes 
informed traders trade less. With strategic traders, the tax enhances liquidity if the informed trader is a 
monopolist, but worsens liquidity with multiple informed traders. With competitive informed traders, the 
tax tends to reduce liquidity under most parameter values. However, if markets are large and competitive 
but the mass of informed traders is small, liquidity can increase under the tax regime. Dow and Rahi 
present a model with informed speculators and uninformed investors with hedging motives, and also find 
that a transaction tax would make the informed traders trade less. The effects of taxes on the welfare of 
investors and the informativeness of prices depend on the values of different parameters in their model, but 
for some sets of parameters a securities transaction tax is pareto improving.  
22 We will not be discussing other potential effects of the tax that were mentioned in the literature such as a 
reduction in “excess” production of private information, a move away from the short-term focus on the part 
of management, the equilibrium effects on expected returns and the cost of capital, distortions in capital 
structure, and the flight of trading to markets abroad, as well as issues related to implantation, compliance, 
and tax revenues. 
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Panel B of Figure 5 looks directly at the provision of depth at the best bid and 
offer prices (BBO) by different trader types. Taxes again affect trader types differently 
(p-value = 0.0214). Noise traders reduce their provision of liquidity at the BBO from 0.82 
shares without taxes to 0.50 under the tax regime (this reduction is highly significant with 
simple effect p-value = 0.0066). On the other hand, informed traders and liquidity traders 
provide greater liquidity when taxes are imposed (1.02 and 1.23, respectively) compared 
to the no tax case (0.81 and 1.06, respectively).  
As traders’ strategies change with the imposition of the tax, so too will their 
returns.  Table 3 presents gross and net profits by tax level, extremity level, and trader 
type. We observe that noise traders actually make money (45.49 dollars) when there are 
no transaction taxes and the value of the information of the informed traders is low. In 
fact, in this cell (no tax, low extremity) they make more money then do informed traders 
(who make 30.94 dollars). This probably reflects two effects. The first is profitable 
liquidity provision as we find that noise traders have a higher rate of limit order 
submission and greater provision of BBO depth in the no tax, low extremity case. 
Second, noise traders lose less when trading with the informed traders in low extremity 
securities because adverse selection is low. On the other hand, when informed traders 
have valuable information (in the high extremity securities), noise traders lose a lot of 
money, 210.34 dollars.  
The situation changes markedly under the tax regime. Noise traders now lose in 
both low and high extremity securities. In the low extremity securities, we observed 
before that they provide much less liquidity and so do not realize market making profits. 
As such, they have gross trading losses of 69.64 and net trading losses (when taxes are 
considered) of 124.91 dollars. On the other hand, taxes seem to deter some of the 
speculative trading on trends that caused their losses in high extremity securities when 
there were no taxes in the economy. Under the tax regime, their gross trading loss is 
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90.02 dollars (compared with 210.34 dollars without taxes) leaving them with a net loss 
of 136.56 dollars after taxes are incorporated 
Taxes also affect the profits of the informed traders. While they make gross 
trading profits even when their information is less valuable, their average net profit is just 
0.8 dollars. When their information is more valuable in high extremity securities, 
informed traders seem to trade less aggressively on their information and their gross 
trading profit goes down from 275.37 (without taxes) to 161.73 (with taxes). This leaves 
them with only 97.90 dollars of net profit under the tax regime in the high extremity case.  
These results suggest that taxes are not a pareto improving intervention in this 
economy (unlike the result for some parameter values in Dow and Rahi [2000]) as the 
informed traders make significantly less money. However, taxes do seem to be good for 
the noise traders under certain circumstances. In particular, when the realized value is 
further away from the expected value and the market is characterized by more volatile 
prices and higher adverse selection, taxes deter speculative trading by noise traders and 
so reduce their losses.  
 
4.2.  Volume and Liquidity 
There are reasons to believe that the imposition of taxes will lower overall volume 
in the market. Constantinides [1986] argues theoretically how an increase in transaction 
costs reduces volume, and Umlauf [1993] finds empirically that the imposition of a 
securities transaction tax in Sweden reduced trading volume. We find this to be the case 
in our experiment as well. The average number of shares traded per capita in our 
experiment goes down from 46 shares without taxes to 35.44 shares under the tax regime 
(p-value = 0.0013). The most marked decrease is in the trading of the noise traders, going 
down from 39.97 shares without taxes to 25.45 shares with taxes (p-value = 0.0403). 
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Informed traders also decrease trading, from 47.96 to 40.92 shares, although this decrease 
is not statistically significant.23   
While both proponents and opponents of securities transaction taxes agree that 
volume is likely to decline, there is no consensus on the effects of taxes on liquidity. 
Lower volume (or frequency of transactions) may increase the inventory costs of liquidity 
providers in the spirit of Amihud and Mendelson [1980]. On the other hand, if reduced 
noise trading makes prices less volatile, the risk of holding shares would go down (Stoll 
[1978]). Therefore, inventory holding costs may go either up or down. As for adverse 
selection costs, these could go up because the probability of informed trading is higher 
when noise traders reduce their trading by a much larger amount than do informed traders 
(e.g., Glosten and Milgrom [1985], Easley and O’Hara [1992]). On the other hand, if 
strategic informed traders trade less aggressively on their information due to decreased 
noise trading (in the spirit of Kyle [1985]), adverse selection costs would not change.  
We measure liquidity here as the total price impact of market orders, which is 
equivalent to the effective spread used in empirical studies. We also borrow from the 
empirical market microstructure literature and decompose the total price impact into a 
permanent price impact and a temporary price impact. The total, permanent, and 
temporary price impacts for a market order at time t that is characterized by a transaction 
price Pt and quote midpoint Mt are computed as follow:  
5
5
5
 for market buy orders
Total Price Impact
 for market sell orders
for market buy orders
Permanent Price Impact
for market sell orders
 for mar
Temporary Price Impact
t t
t t
t t
t t
t t
P M
M P
M M
M M
P M
+
+
+
−=  −
−=  −
−=
5
ket buy orders
for market sell orderst tM P+
 −
 
                                                 
23 The slight decrease in the level of informed trading that we observe could be consistent with the 
theoretical models of Subrahmanyam [1998] and Dow and Rahi [2000], but there is too much variability in 
the data to determine that for sure. 
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where t+5 denotes the midquote prevailing five trades after the trade for which we are 
computing the price impact measures 
Note that these definitions mean that the total price impact is the sum of the 
permanent and temporary price impacts. The total price impact (effective spread) 
measures the transaction costs incurred by trader who submits a market order. The 
permanent price impact of a market order is viewed as a manifestation of the private 
information content of the order.  The temporary price impact (also known in the 
empirical literature as the realized spread) is viewed as a measure of efficiency of the 
liquidity provision mechanism. It provides some information about the profitability of 
liquidity provision because it measures the price reversal from the trade price.  
The total price impact of market orders is significantly lower under the tax 
regime: 1.93 dollars compared with 2.48 dollars without taxes (p-value = 0.0085). While 
the permanent effect seems to be a bit lower with taxes, the effect is not statistically 
significant. The large decrease in the total price impact comes from a large decrease in 
the temporary price impact from 2.17 dollars without taxes to 1.60 dollars with taxes (p-
value = 0.0031). Liquidity, as manifested by the price impact of a market order, seems to 
be significantly better under the tax regime and the lower price impact is not due to a 
lower information content of market orders but rather to more efficient (and less 
expensive) liquidity provision, or in other orders, less price reversal.  
There is, however, an interesting and statistically significant interaction with 
extremity of the realized value of the security (p-value = 0.0310 for total impact and p-
value = 0.0437 for the temporary impact). Figure 6 shows the permanent, temporary, and 
total (the sum of the two) impacts separately for high and low extremity securities both 
with and without taxes. The total price impact goes down a bit from 2.22 to 2.00 dollars 
for low extremity securities when we impose taxes. This decrease is to a large extent due 
to a decrease in the temporary impact from 1.95 to 1.65 dollars. Taxes, however, seem to 
affect liquidity for high extremity securities in a much more drastic fashion. The 
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temporary price impact is 2.40 dollars without taxes and only 1.54 dollars with taxes. 
This is reflected in a total transaction cost to demanders of liquidity that goes down from 
2.75 to 1.87 dollars when taxes are imposed.  
The decrease in transaction costs of market orders despite the fact that overall 
volume in the market goes down is not a trivial result. The fact that it comes mainly from 
the temporary price impact rather than the permanent price impact points to an 
explanation in the spirit of inventory control or the provision of liquidity by risk averse 
investors (see Grossman and Miller [1988]), rather than adverse selection. We observe 
that noise traders supply less liquidity but informed and liquidity traders seem to increase 
their presence at the BBO when taxes are imposed. Our profit analysis shows that noise 
traders are not good at trading on trends when markets are more volatile as in the case of 
high extremity securities. It is likely that their trading creates overshooting and reversal 
of prices in the absence of taxes, and since taxes cause them to curb their trading in high 
extremity securities, prices tend to exhibit smaller reversals and therefore a lower 
temporary price impact of trades. Hence, our analysis demonstrates that while taxes result 
in lower volume, their impact on liquidity can be positive. 
 
4.3.  Value Discovery and Informational Efficiency 
We use the measures introduced in Section 3.3 to investigate the effects of taxes 
on value discovery and informational efficiency. Figure 7 shows that taxes  significantly 
affect how market orders of different trader types contribute to (or interfere with) the 
adjustment of prices toward their full-information level (p-value = 0.0369 for the 
tax*type interaction).  It seems as if a transaction tax affects the value discovery function 
of market orders used by informed traders and liquidity traders much more than it does 
for the noise traders. The most striking result is that informed traders’ market orders 
contribute much less to the adjustment of prices toward the true value under the tax 
regime, 0.026, then in the case without taxes, 0.214. On the other hand, liquidity traders 
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are interfering much less with the adjustment of prices under the tax regime (−0.086) as 
opposed to their impact on prices when taxes are not imposed (−0.279).  
To examine the overall effect of these changes on informational efficiency we 
examine the market-wide pricing error measures, DEVP (deviations of transaction prices 
from the true value) and DEVMID (deviations of midquotes prevailing at the time of 
transactions from the true value). Both measures seem to be slightly lower under the tax 
regime: 13.76 for DEVP and 13.55 for DEVMID compared with 14.65 and 14.15 
(respectively) when there are no taxes in the economy. However, these differences are 
not statistically significant, indicating that there may be little change in informational 
efficiency when taxes are imposed.  
To examine whether taxes influence the manner in which informed and noise 
trading affect informational efficiency we run regressions similar in spirit to those in 
Section 3.3. Specifically, we regress the informational efficiency measures on the amount 
of noise trading and informed trading with dummy variables for tax and no tax securities. 
We then use structural stability tests to examine the hypothesis that taxes have no 
influence on the manner in which noise and informed trading affect informational 
efficiency. 
Table 4 provides the results of these regressions. We observe that in the 
regression on DEVP, greater amount of noise trading is associated with higher pricing 
errors when there are no taxes in the economy. On the other hand, the coefficient on noise 
trading is not statistically significant under the tax regime. The Chow test for structural 
stability rejects the null hypothesis of no structural change (p = 0.0008). A similar picture 
is also observed in the regression on DEVMID, and the Chow test is significant for this 
regression as well.  
These regressions suggest that while taxes may not necessarily lower pricing 
errors, they may weaken the link between noise trading and informational efficiency. 
When taxes are imposed, noise traders trade less and therefore do not affect the market to 
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the same extent. As such, their trading may have a less reliable effect on the 
informational efficiency of prices. While the magnitude of the coefficient on noise 
trading is similar with and without taxes, the loss of statistical significance of the 
coefficient under the tax regime, together with the significant Chow tests, suggest that 
noise traders’ impact on pricing errors diminishes. 
 
4.4.  Volatility 
Probably the number one goal of a securities transaction tax in the eyes of its 
proponents is a reduction in the volatility of prices (Stiglitz [1989], Summers and 
Summers [1989]). While part of the volatility of prices reflects adjustment to 
fundamental information, transaction taxes are supposed to rid prices of “excess” 
volatility that is due to noise trading.24 However, there is no consensus on whether a 
transaction tax would in fact reduce volatility. Kupiec [1996], for example, shows that the 
volatilities of prices and returns respond in opposite ways to the imposition of a securities 
transaction tax.  
We find that the standard deviation of transaction prices (STDP) without taxes is 
4.07 and with taxes it is 3.53. Similarly, the transaction price range (PRAGNE) is 20.21 
dollars when no taxes are imposed and 16.84 dollars under the tax regime. However, 
there is enough variability in the data so that these differences are not statistically 
significant. Also, in the regressions of STDP and PRANGE on the amount of noise and 
informed trading, the structural stability tests cannot reject the hypothesis of no structural 
change with and without taxes. This means that taxes do not seem to affect the manner in 
which noise trading and informed trading are associated with volatility. Therefore, we 
cannot conclude that a securities transaction tax can be used to lower price volatility even 
                                                 
24 De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann [1990] show how noise traders can introduce volatility into 
prices beyond the volatility that is due to fundamental risk. 
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though we document that more noise trading is associated with higher volatility and that 
taxes make noise traders trade less. 
 
4.5  Dynamics of Profits and Trading 
Finally, we turn to the interesting question of the “survival” of noise traders in 
financial markets, or whether noise traders will consistently lose money and therefore be 
driven out of the market.  If Friedman’s wealth dynamic arguments are correct, we would 
expect to find that noise traders who lose more money subsequently trade less.  We 
therefore record for all noise traders their net profit and amount of trading in each trading 
period and run a bivariate vector autoregression (VAR) of profit and trading separately 
for markets with and without taxes.25  
Panel A of Table 5 presents the results for a VAR with two lags in the case of no 
taxes.26 Both coefficients on past profit in the profit equation are positive and statistically 
significant, indicating that there is some consistency (or skill) involved in trading: traders 
who lose more in the past are also likely to lose more in the future. On the other hand, the 
two profit coefficients in the NOISETRD equation are not statistically significant, and the 
Granger Causality test for profit is also not significant. This means that we cannot find 
evidence that past profit affects future trading. The coefficients on past trading, however, 
are highly statistically significant in the NOISETRD equation, providing some evidence 
that traders adopt a “style” of trading—some simply trade more while others trade less. 
Panel B of Table 5 presents a similar VAR applied to the securities that are 
subject to a transaction tax. The most notable difference is that the coefficient on the first 
lag of profit in the NOISETRD equation is positive and statistically significant. 
                                                 
25 We pool together the 12 consecutive securities that trade without taxes from each of the eight cohorts 
into one VAR, and the 12 consecutive securities that trade with taxes from each of the eight cohorts into 
another VAR.  
26 Similar results are obtained if an exogenous regressor is added to the model to pick up learning due to 
experience with the experiment (i.e., a time variable). Also, we looked at different lag structures (up to five 
lags) and our conclusions are unchanged. 
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Furthermore, the Granger Causality test for profit is significant (p = 0.0422) indicating 
that profit Granger-cause trading.27 This result means that noise traders who lose more 
money in a trading period are likely to trade less in the following period. This effect is 
consistent with the idea that noise traders will eventually be driven out of the market (or 
at least trade less), but we observe a significant effect only under the tax regime.  
It is possible that the transaction tax serves as an “awareness” device in that it 
makes noise traders pay more attention to the relation between trading and losses. We 
documented that noise traders trade less under the tax regime, presumably for the same 
reason, and here we also see that they take note of losses by cutting down further on their 
future trading. Our experiment, therefore, suggests another mechanism by which a 
securities transaction tax may affects noise trading that has not been mentioned 
previously in the literature. It is not just that the higher costs deter trading because some 
short-term speculative strategies are no longer profitable when taxes are considered. It 
could also be the case that the tax forces noise traders to keep track of their trading and 
profits more vigilantly. It therefore serves to educate them and draw their attention to the 
relation between their trading and the resulting losses, and by that makes noise traders 
realize that they trade on noise, and therefore cause them to reduce trading or exit the 
market. 
    
5.  The Limits of Noise Trading 
Noise trading is a contentious but important issue in the study of asset markets. 
We have analyzed the role of noise trading in an experimental market with noise traders, 
informed traders, and liquidity traders with exogenous trading needs.  Our purpose was to 
delineate both how noise traders fare in markets and how their trading affects market 
performance, and to these ends we have had some success.  Our analysis has provided a 
                                                 
27 The Granger Causality test on NOISETRD is also significant, and so the relation goes in both directions. 
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number of results on the role and behavior of noise traders.  In this final section, we now 
consider these results in the context of their implications for market behavior.  We also 
discuss the limitations of our analysis, with particular attention given to the aspects of 
noise trader and market behavior we are not able to examine here. 
Perhaps the most important implication of our research is that noise traders, on 
balance, are not particularly beneficial to market performance.  Noise traders do not make 
prices more efficient, they tend to increase market volatility, and there is little evidence 
that noise traders provide liquidity to other traders.  This view of noise trading is very 
much at odds with positive declarations that noise traders are the “grease that makes 
markets work.”   Our analysis, instead, suggests that markets work in spite of, and not 
because of, noise traders. 
Proponents of noise trading might argue that our analysis misses an important 
aspect of noise trading: the more noise traders willing to lose money, the greater benefit 
to informed trading, and so more information production takes place.  While aspects of 
this logic are correct, our results show that it is too simplistic.  Noise trading is not a 
simple scaling factor.  Noise traders change the price process in complex ways:  
Volatility is increased, prices can overshoot true values, and liquidity production is 
affected.  These changes benefit some traders, but also penalize them as well.  While our 
setting does not explicitly allow for changes in the numbers of informed traders, it does 
allow informed trading to adjust to market conditions. Our findings on the impact of the 
securities transaction tax illustrate that the linkage between informed trading and noise 
trading is complex. 
A second significant implication of our results is that noise traders do not prosper 
in the short-run and they would not thrive (or survive) in the long run, especially in the 
presence of securities transaction taxes.  In our experiments, noise traders eschew the 
potentially profitable role of liquidity provider and instead concentrate on trend-chasing.  
DSSW [1990; 1991] argue that such behavior could allow for survival because traders 
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taking on such risks could potentially earn a return from doing so.  But the noise trader 
analysis of DSSW is limited in some very important ways.  For example, DSSW [1991] 
do not allow noise traders to affect prices; instead, rational traders are assumed to be 
price-setters and noise traders then free-ride, as it were, on the price process.  In actual 
markets, as in our experimental markets here, all traders affect prices, and when they do, 
they bear both the costs and benefits of their actions. 
Another limitation of DSSW [1991] is that they do not allow for differential 
information. Unlike the informed traders allowed here, DSSW consider a world in which 
rational traders have correct beliefs about the distribution of returns on assets, while noise 
traders do not.  This framework is an interesting one for many questions, but it does not 
incorporate the complexities introduced when some traders (the informed) have better 
information than other traders do.  This latter framework is the basis for microstructure 
analyses of price formation, and as we show here allowing asymmetric information 
greatly reduces the viability and survivability of noise traders.  The noise trader risk in 
our markets appears to be greatest for the noise traders themselves. 
Finally, we turn to our results on the impact of a securities transactions tax.  We 
find that the STT has many useful effects on markets, although reducing volatility is not 
one of them.  If the goal of such a tax is to limit noise trading, then our results provide 
some backing for this approach.  But we caution here that our analysis is not general 
enough to provide overall conclusions on securities transaction taxes.  We do not, for 
example, allow such taxes to influence portfolio-based liquidity traders’ participation 
decisions, although such effects are likely to be significant.  Should liquidity traders opt 
not to participate in markets with securities transaction taxes, risk sharing and 
allocational efficiency in the economy would suffer, and market performance would 
almost surely be degraded.28  Indeed, this difficulty underscores a general concern with 
                                                 
28 For a discussion of the issues surrounding participation effects and securities transaction taxes see 
O’Hara [2004]. 
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the unfocused nature of such taxes; while their goal may be to affect particular traders, 
the incidence of the tax falls on every market participant.  More targeted approaches, 
such as the SECs minimum wealth requirements for day traders, may be a more effective 
strategy to limit particular types of trading. 
What, then, to conclude about the role of noise trading?  We believe our results 
establish that noise trading is not a panacea for market ills.  Increasing noise trading in 
markets would not improve the efficiency of markets, nor would it necessarily improve 
the provision of liquidity.  Conversely, decreasing noise trading could potentially reduce 
the complexity of the price formation process and perhaps even lower volatility.  This is 
not to say, however, that the optimum level of noise trading is zero.  Noise traders trade 
for a variety of reasons, including perhaps that they simply like to trade.  Noise traders 
will enter markets drawn by these motivations, and they will exit markets due to the 
losses they sustain.  Market forces influence both events, and thus ultimately the market 
itself determines the limits of noise trading. 
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Table 1 
Informational Efficiency Regressions 
 
This table presents a regression analysis of pricing errors. For each security (i.e., for each trading period), 
we compute two definitions of pricing errors. The first definition (DEVP) is the absolute value of the 
difference between true value of the security and the transaction price, averaged across all trades in a 
security. The second definition (DEVMID) is the absolute value of the difference between the true value of 
the security and the midpoint between the limit order book’s best bid and offer prevailing at the time of the 
transaction, averaged across all trades in a security. We also record the number of trades (sum of market 
orders and executed limit orders) of the noise traders (NOISETRD) and the informed traders (INFTRD). 
We then run the following OLS regression: 
  DEVPi = a + b * NOISETRDi + c * INFTRDi + Errori 
and a similar specification where DEVMID is the dependent variable. Panel A presents the results of these 
regressions using all securities and all cohorts (24 securities times 8 cohorts). In Panel B we provide 
robustness analysis on the results of the above regression. We first run a separate regression for each of the 
eight cohorts (over the 24 securities each cohort traded). We then report the mean and median of the 
coefficients from these eight regressions alongside a t-test and a Wilcoxon test against the hypothesis of a 
zero mean/median. This approach allows us to draw inferences from across cohorts, which can be assumed 
independent. In Panel C we introduce a dummy variable (D) that is equal to zero for low extremity 
securities and one for high extremity securities, where low (high) extremity means that the realized value of 
the security is no more than (at least) $15 from its unconditional value. We interact the dummy variable 
with the intercept, NOISETRD, and INFTRD, and run a regression using all securities from the eight 
cohorts. We present the full dummy variable format (without an intercept) to look at the relationship 
between pricing errors and trading by noise and informed traders separately in each extremity level.  
 
Panel A: Regressions of Pricing Errors on Noise and Informed Trading 
Dependent 
Variable 
a  
Intercept 
(p-value) 
b  
NOISETRD 
(p-value) 
c  
INFTRD 
(p-value) 
R2 
(in %) 
No. of 
Observations 
DEVP 
13.9023 
(0.0000) 
0.0953 
(0.0016) 
−0.0762 
(0.0003) 
7.37 192 
DEVMID 
13.8454 
(0.0000) 
0.0809 
(0.0085) 
−0.0724 
(0.0008) 
6.09 192 
 
 
Panel B: Robustness Analysis of Pricing Errors Regressions 
NOISETRD INFTRD 
Dependent 
Variable 
Mean 
(p-value from 
t-test) 
Median 
(p-value from 
Wilcoxon test) 
Mean 
(p-value from 
t-test) 
Median 
(p-value from 
Wilcoxon test) 
DEVP 
0.1151 
(0.0198) 
0.0965 
(0.0300) 
−0.0762 
(0.0255) 
−0.0687 
(0.0423) 
DEVMID 
0.1083 
(0.0334) 
0.0825 
(0.0423) 
−0.0742 
(0.0355) 
−0.0582 
(0.0423) 
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Panel C: Pricing Error Regressions with an Extremity Interaction 
 Low Extremity High Extremity   
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Intercept 
*(1-D) 
(p-value) 
NOISETRD 
*(1-D) 
(p-value) 
INFTRD 
*(1-D) 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
*D 
(p-value) 
NOISETRD 
*D 
(p-value) 
INFTRD 
*D 
(p-value) 
R2 
(in %) 
Obs. 
DEVP 
8.1810 
(0.0000) 
0.0965 
(0.0230) 
−0.0300 
(0.2223) 
20.9426 
(0.0000) 
0.0607 
(0.0716) 
−0.1541 
(0.0003) 
30.09 192 
DEVMID 
7.5505 
(0.0000) 
0.0914 
(0.0312) 
−0.0258 
(0.2935) 
21.7042 
(0.0000) 
0.0380 
(0.2588) 
−0.1597 
(0.0002) 
32.09 192 
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Table 2 
Volatility Regressions 
 
This table presents a regression analysis of price volatility measures. For each security (i.e., for each 
trading period), we compute two definitions of volatility. The first definition (STDP) is the standard 
deviation of transaction prices in a security. The second definition (PRANGE) is the price range (high 
minus low) in a security. We also record the number of trades (sum of market orders and executed limit 
orders) of the noise traders (NOISETRD) and the informed traders (INFTRD). We then run the following 
OLS regression: 
  STDPi = a + b * NOISETRDi + c * INFTRDi + Errori 
and a similar specification where PRANGE is the dependent variable. Panel A presents the results of these 
regressions using all securities and all cohorts (24 securities times 8 cohorts). In Panel B we provide 
robustness analysis on the results of the above regression. We first run a separate regression for each of the 
eight cohorts (over the 24 securities each cohort traded). We then report the mean and median of the 
coefficients from these eight regressions alongside a t-test and a Wilcoxon test against the hypothesis of a 
zero mean/median. This approach allows us to draw inferences from across cohorts, which can be assumed 
independent. In Panel C we introduce a dummy variable (D) that is equal to zero for low extremity 
securities and one for high extremity securities, where low (high) extremity means that the realized value of 
the security is no more than (at least) $15 from its unconditional value. We interact the dummy variable 
with the intercept, NOISETRD, and INFTRD, and run a regression using all securities from the eight 
cohorts. We present the full dummy variable format (without an intercept) to look at the relationship 
between volatility and trading by noise and informed traders separately in each extremity level. 
 
Panel A: Regressions of Volatility Measures on Noise and Informed Trading 
Dependent 
Variable 
a  
Intercept 
(p-value) 
b  
NOISETRD 
(p-value) 
c  
INFTRD 
(p-value) 
R2 
(in %) 
No. of 
Observations 
STDP 
3.4920 
(0.0000) 
0.0258 
(0.0165) 
−0.0119 
(0.1094) 
3.02 192 
PRANGE 
16.4860 
(0.0000) 
0.1155 
(0.0042) 
−0.0417 
(0.1349) 
4.30 192 
 
 
Panel B: Robustness Analysis of Volatility Regressions 
NOISETRD INFTRD 
Dependent 
Variable 
Mean 
(p-value from 
t-test) 
Median 
(p-value from 
Wilcoxon test) 
Mean 
(p-value from 
t-test) 
Median 
(p-value from 
Wilcoxon test) 
STDP 
−0.0058 
(0.7360) 
−0.0063 
(0.6241) 
−0.0087 
(0.4667) 
−0.0095 
(0.4412) 
PRANGE 
0.0132 
(0.8498) 
−0.0095 
(0.9442) 
−0.0254 
(0.5076) 
−0.0798 
(0.6241) 
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Panel C: Volatility Regressions with an Extremity Interaction 
 Low Extremity High Extremity   
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Intercept 
*(1-D) 
(p-value) 
NOISETRD 
*(1-D) 
(p-value) 
INFTRD 
*(1-D) 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
*D 
(p-value) 
NOISETRD 
*D 
(p-value) 
INFTRD 
*D 
(p-value) 
R2 
(in %) 
Obs. 
STDP 
3.5003 
(0.0000) 
0.0045 
(0.7945) 
−0.0008 
(0.9402) 
3.5572 
(0.0000) 
0.0380 
(0.0063) 
−0.0208 
(0.2245) 
4.50 192 
PRANGE 
16.5534 
(0.0000) 
0.0394 
(0.5395) 
0.0071 
(0.8500) 
18.8406 
(0.0000) 
0.1641 
(0.0015) 
−0.1534 
(0.0164) 
6.83 192 
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Table 3 
Trader Profit with and without Taxes 
 
This table reports gross and net profits of the traders by tax regime and extremity level. In the setting with a 
securities transaction tax (STT), we impose a $2 fee for each trade. In a no-tax setting, no fees are imposed. 
Low (high) extremity means that the realized value of the security is no more than (at least) $15 from its 
unconditional value. Gross profit is the trading profit a trader makes before taxes. Net profit is gross profit 
minus the STT paid by the trader. We first compute each profit definition for an individual trader per 
security, and then average it for a trader type within each of the eight cohorts. The numbers in the table 
represent the averages across the cohorts. 
 
Gross Profit Net Profit Tax 
Regime 
Extremity 
Level Noise Informed Liquidity Noise Informed Liquidity 
Low 45.49 30.94 -76.43 45.49 30.94 -76.43 
No Tax 
High -210.34 275.37 -65.04 -210.34 275.37 -65.04 
Low -69.64 100.64 -31.00 -124.91 0.80 -110.28 
Tax 
High -90.02 161.73 -71.70 -136.56 97.90 -152.21 
 48
Table 4 
Informational Efficiency Regressions with Dummy Variable for Tax 
 
This table presents a regression analysis of pricing errors, which we use as measures of informational 
efficiency, by tax regime. For each security (i.e., for each trading period), we compute two definitions of 
pricing errors. The first definition (DEVP) is the absolute value of the difference between true value of the 
security and the transaction price, averaged across all trades in a security. The second definition 
(DEVMID) is the absolute value of the difference between the true value of the security and the midpoint 
between the limit order book’s best bid and offer prevailing at the time of the transaction, averaged across 
all trades in a security. We also record the number of trades (sum of market orders and executed limit 
orders) of the noise traders (NOISETRD) and the informed traders (INFTRD). In the setting with a 
securities transaction tax (STT), we impose a $2 fee for each trade. In a no-tax setting, no fees are imposed. 
We define a dummy variable (D) that is equal to zero for trading periods without taxes and one for trading 
periods when the STT is imposed. We then run an OLS regression using all securities from the eight 
cohorts of the pricing error measure on an intercept, NOISETRD, and INFTRD interacted with the tax 
dummy variable. We present the full dummy variable format (without an intercept) to look at the 
relationship between pricing errors and trading by noise and informed traders separately in each tax regime.  
 
 No Tax Tax   
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Intercept 
*(1-D) 
(p-value) 
NOISETRD 
*(1-D) 
(p-value) 
INFTRD 
*(1-D) 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
*D 
(p-value) 
NOISETRD 
*D 
(p-value) 
INFTRD 
*D 
(p-value) 
R2 
(in %) 
Obs. 
DEVP 
13.0791 
(0.0000) 
0.0912 
(0.0128 
−0.0560 
(0.0336) 
15.4599 
(0.0000) 
0.0889 
(0.1494) 
−0.1097 
(0.0018) 
8.56 192 
DEVMID 
12.9997 
(0.0000) 
0.0749 
(0.0448) 
−0.0503 
(0.0611) 
15.4227 
(0.0000) 
0.0797 
(0.2059) 
−0.1094 
(0.0024) 
7.36 192 
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Table 5 
Dynamics between Profit and Noise Trading with and without Taxes 
 
This table presents a vector autoregression (VAR) analysis of trading and net profits of the noise traders. In 
the setting with a securities transaction tax (STT), we impose a $2 fee for each trade. In a no-tax setting, no 
fees are imposed. NetProfit is defined as the trading profit of an individual noise trader in a security minus 
the STT paid by the trader. We also record the number of trades (sum of market orders and executed limit 
orders) of the individual noise trader (NOISETRD) in a security. In Panel A, we use the 12 consecutive 
securities in each cohort where traders did not pay taxes, and run a bivariate VAR with two lags over 320 
observations: 4 (noise traders) * 12 (securities) * 8 (cohorts), minus 64 observations due to the lag 
structure. In Panel B we run a similar bivariate VAR for the 12 consecutive securities in each cohort where 
taxes were imposed. The VAR is estimated using OLS. 
 
Panel A: VAR of Noise Traders’ Net Profit and Trading without Tax 
Dependent 
Variables 
NetProfitt-1 
(p-value) 
NetProfitt-2 
(p-value) 
NOISETRDt-1 
(p-value) 
NOISETRDt-2 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
(p-value) 
R2 
(in %) 
NetProfitt 
0.1898 
(0.0023) 
0.2421 
(0.0001) 
−3.6007 
(0.0069) 
−1.1220 
(0.4166) 
144.5022 
(0.0368) 
23.71 
NOISETRDt 
−0.0008 
(0.7797) 
0.0007 
(0.8186) 
0.3109 
(0.0000) 
0.4561 
(0.0000) 
11.8577 
(0.0002) 
40.42 
 
Panel B: VAR of Noise Traders’ Net Profit and Trading with Tax 
Dependent 
Variables 
NetProfitt-1 
(p-value) 
NetProfitt-2 
(p-value) 
NOISETRDt-1 
(p-value) 
NOISETRDt-2 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
(p-value) 
R2 
(in %) 
NetProfitt 
0.0171 
(0.7855) 
0.1642 
(0.0154) 
−4.1581 
(0.0003) 
−1.5642 
(0.2296) 
32.5548 
(0.3946) 
14.20 
NOISETRDt 
0.0072 
(0.0230) 
−0.0040 
(0.2313) 
0.3851 
(0.0000) 
0.5105 
(0.0000) 
5.1826 
(0.0071) 
47.98 
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Figure 1 
Market-wide Summary Statistics 
This figure presents summary statistics for volume and bid-ask spreads over time. Volume is defined as the 
number of shares traded. Bid-ask spread is the difference between the best price in the book for buying a 
share and the best price in the book for selling a share. The variables are computed separately for each 15-
second interval in a trading period, and then averaged across all trading periods (i.e., securities) for the 
eight cohorts.  
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Figure 2 
Orders and Trades by Trader Type 
 
This figure presents summary statistics on orders and trades for the different types of traders: noise, 
informed, and liquidity. Panel A separately reports the average numbers of limit and market orders 
submitted by the traders. Each limit order submitted by a trader is for one share. Market (or marketable 
limit) orders are defined as the taking of limit orders at the best prices in the book. Panel B plots the 
average number of one-share trades executed by a trader who belongs to one of the three types. The number 
of trades is broken down into trades executed by submitting a market orders and trades that occur as a result 
of a trader’s previously submitted limit order being executed.  
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Figure 3 
Traders’ Profit and BBO Depth Provision 
 
This table reports gross profits of the traders and their contribution to depth at the best bid or offer (BBO) 
by trader type and extremity level. Low (high) extremity means that the realized value of the security is no 
more than (at least) $15 from its unconditional value. In Panel A, gross profit is the trading profit a trader 
makes before taxes. We first compute the profit for an individual trader per security, and then average it for 
a trader type within each of the eight cohorts. The numbers in the table represent the averages across the 
cohorts. Panel B shows how much depth (in number of shares) each trader type contributes to the best bid 
or offer prices. We take snapshots of the contribution to depth at the BBO of all trader types each time any 
trader submits or cancels an order. The average contribution to BBO depth of a trader belonging to a certain 
type is computed as the simple average of these snapshots divided by the number of traders of each type. 
We then average these numbers across cohorts.    
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Panel B: BBO Depth Provision in Number of Shares by Trader Type and Extremity Level 
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Figure 4 
Value Discovery 
 
This figure presents evidence on the contribution of a trader type to value discovery, or whether their trades 
move prices closer to or away from the true value. In Panel A, we present two measures of value discovery 
(measure A and measure B) by trader type. For Measure A, we sort executed orders into those moving 
prices toward the true value or away from it. If the true value is higher than the price, we assign +1 to a buy 
order of a trader that resulted in a trade and −1 to a sell order that resulted in a trade.  If the true value is 
lower than the price, we assign −1 (+1) to a buy (sell) order of a trader that resulted in a trade. The measure 
is then aggregated for all market and executed limit orders of a trader and divided by the number of his 
trades (the measure is therefore always in the range [−1, +1]). The more positive (negative) measure A of a 
trader, the more his trades contribute to (interfere with) value discovery. Measure B of value discovery is 
constructed in a similar way to measure A, except that we consider only trades resulting from market orders 
submitted by the trader. Therefore, it considers contribution or interference with value discovery only for 
the “active” side of a trade. Panel B presents value discovery measure A by trader type and extremity level. 
Low (high) extremity means that the realized value of the security is no more than (at least) $15 from its 
unconditional value. For both panels, we first compute each measure for an individual trader and then 
average it for a trader type within each of the eight cohorts. The numbers in the figure represent the 
averages across the cohorts. 
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Panel B: Value Discovery Measure A by Trader Type and Extremity Level 
Value Discovery Measure A by Extremity Level
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Figure 5 
Trader Strategies with and without Taxes 
 
This figure presents two aspects of the traders’ strategies under the different tax regimes. In the setting with 
a securities transaction tax (STT), we impose a $2 fee for each trade. In a no-tax setting, no fees are 
imposed.  In Panel A, we report the submission rate of limit orders defined as the number of limit orders 
divided by the total number of orders a trader submits. We first compute the submission rate for an 
individual trader and then average it for a trader type within each of the eight cohorts. The numbers in the 
figure represent the averages across the cohorts. Panel B shows how much depth (in number of shares) each 
trader type contributes to the best bid or offer prices. We take snapshots of the contribution to depth at the 
BBO of all trader types each time any trader submits or cancels an order. The average contribution to BBO 
depth of a trader belonging to a certain type is computed as the simple average of these snapshots divided 
by the number of traders of each type. We then average these numbers across cohorts. 
 
Panel A: Submission Rates of Limit Orders by Trader Type and Tax Level 
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Panel B: Depth Provision at the Best Bid and Offer Prices by Trader Type and Tax Level 
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Figure 6 
Price Impact of Market Orders by Extremity and Tax Levels 
 
This figure presents evidence on one aspect of market liquidity—the price impact of market orders—by tax 
regime and extremity level. In the setting with a securities transaction tax (STT), we impose a $2 fee for 
each trade. In a no-tax setting, no fees are imposed. Low (high) extremity means that the realized value of 
the security is no more than (at least) $15 from its unconditional value. The total price impact (the total 
height of each column in the figure) is further decomposed into temporary and permanent components. The 
total, permanent, and temporary price impacts for a market order at time t that is characterized by a 
transaction price Pt and a prevailing quote midpoint Mt are computed as follows:  
5
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where t+5 denotes the midquote prevailing five traders after the trade for which we are computing the price 
impact measure. The numbers in the figure represent the averages across the securities and cohorts. 
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Figure 7 
Value Discovery by Tax Levels 
 
This figure presents evidence on the contribution of a trader type to value discovery, or whether their trades 
move prices closer to or away from the true value, by tax regime. In the setting with a securities transaction 
tax (STT), we impose a $2 fee for each trade. In a no-tax setting, no fees are imposed. To construct the 
value discovery measure (Measure B), we sort a trader’s market orders into those moving prices toward the 
true value or away from it. If the true value is higher than the transaction price, we assign +1 to a market 
buy order and −1 to a market sell order.  If the true value is lower than the transaction price, we assign −1 
(+1) to a market buy (sell) order. The measure is then aggregated for all market orders of a trader and 
divided by the number of market orders (the measure is therefore always in the range [−1, +1]). The more 
positive (negative) measure B of a trader, the more his market orders contribute to (interfere with) value 
discovery. We first compute the measure for an individual trader and then average it for a trader type within 
each of the eight cohorts. The numbers in the figure represent the averages across the cohorts. 
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Appendix 
 
Instructions for an Open Electronic Limit Order Book (ELOB) Market 
 
Overview 
During this session, you will trade many securities that each pay a single liquidating 
dividend denominated in “laboratory dollars.” We will convert your gains or losses into 
U.S. dollars to determine your payment. At the end of trading, we will also ask you a 
series of questions about your experience. The entire session should take about 1.5 hours.  
Please do not talk with other subjects, look at others’ computer screens, or leave the room 
without explicit permission from the experiment administrator. 
 
Liquidating Dividends 
The dividend paid by every security is equal to 50 plus two random numbers, called 
“Component 1” and “Component 2.”  Each component will each range from -25 and 
+25, with each realization equally likely, allowing dividends as low as 0 and as high as 
100.  Note that extreme dividends are less likely than dividends close to 50, because 
there are many ways that the two random numbers can add up to 0, but only one way that 
they can add up to the most extreme high or low dividend.  (Similar reasoning explains 
why two rolled dice are more likely to add up to 7 than 2 or 12.) 
 
Types of Traders 
The market includes three types of traders: 
 
o Informed Traders know one of the two random numbers.  There are two who 
know one number and two who know the other.  
 
o Liquidity Traders are forced to end trading with a share balance exactly equal 
some “target” number of shares, or else they are penalized.  Throughout the 
session, the target is 20 or 30. Two of the traders will have positive targets (they 
will need to buy shares) and two will have negative targets (they will need to sell 
shares).  The (Sell 20, Buy 30) and (Buy 20, Sell 30) combinations are twice as 
likely as the (Sell 20, Buy 20) and (Sell 30, Buy 30) combinations. 
 
o Free traders are not told either random number, and do not have any liquidity 
target. 
 
Sequence of Events 
For each security, you will follow the same sequence of steps: 
 (1) Learn component (if informed trader) or target (if liquidity trader) 
 (2) Estimate security dividend 
 (3) Trade 
 (4) Estimate security dividend 
 (5) Learn true dividend of security 
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Remember that the dividend and market price are not necessarily the same thing. A 
security’s market price is determined by the amount traders are pay or accept, and may 
change as trading progresses.  A security’s dividend is determined by the two random 
numbers selected before trading begins, and never changes. 
 
How to Trade in an Open Electronic Limit Order Book Market 
Trading sessions are 150 seconds long (except for the practice security).  All traders trade 
shares by entering orders that others can “take” or by “taking” orders that others have 
entered.  All orders are for one share, but you can enter and take multiple orders at each 
price.   
 
o Entering a Bid   A bid is an order to buy a share at a stated price.  You will buy at 
that price if someone else chooses to take your bid, and sells a share to you at the 
price you indicated. 
 
o Entering an Ask.  An ask is an order to sell a share at a stated price.  You will sell at 
that price if someone else chooses to take your ask, and buys a share from you at the 
price you indicated. 
 
o Taking a Bid or Ask.  If you click on the “SELL 1” button on the BID column, you 
will sell a share at the highest bid.  If you click on the “BUY 1” button on the ASK 
column, you will buy a share at lowest ask.   
 
o Removing a bid or ask.  You can remove (cancel) a bid or ask that you entered, 
simply by right-clicking on it. 
 
Note that the price graph used on the computer screen shows an initial range from $25 to 
$75.  However, dividends could be as low as 0 or as high as 100.  You can enter and see 
orders for prices outside the initial range by clicking on the up- and down-arrows 
between the graphs. 
 
Some Trading Restrictions 
The following rules keep you from entering or taking any orders you please. 
 
♦ You can’t trade with yourself.  Requests to take your own order will be rejected. 
 
♦ You can never enter a bid at a price greater than your own ask, or an ask at a price 
less than your own bid.  Doing so would be like trying to trade with yourself. 
 
♦ You can’t enter a bid higher than an existing ask or an ask lower than an existing bid.  
If you are willing to buy at the lowest ask, simply click the “BUY 1” button.  If you 
are willing to sell at the highest bid, simply click the “SELL 1” button. 
 
 
Trading Gains and Losses.  You start each security with no cash and no shares. 
However, negative cash and share balances are permitted. Thus, you can buy shares even 
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if you don’t have money to pay for them, and you can sell shares you don’t own (“short 
selling”).  
 
After trading a security, the shares you own pay the liquidating dividend. If you have a 
positive balance of shares, the dividend is added to your cash balance for each share you 
own. If you have a negative balance of shares, the dividend is subtracted from your cash 
balance for each share you own. The resulting number is your trading gain (if positive) or 
trading loss (if negative).   
 
You make money every time you buy a share for less than true dividend or sell a share 
for more than true dividend. For example, buying a share worth $30 at a price of $23 
creates a gain of $7. Selling that share at that price creates a loss of $7. 
 
Trading taxes.  For half of the securities in the experiment, there is a trading tax equal to 
$2 for every share you buy or sell.  Thus, if you buy a share worth $30 at a price of $23 
(as in the example above), your net gain after tax is only $5.  Selling that share at that 
price creates an after-tax loss of $9.  You will always know whether the trading tax is in 
force. 
 
Penalties for Liquidity Traders.  Liquidity traders also may incur penalties for failing to  
achieve their targets.  The penalty is $100 laboratory dollars for each share you fall short 
of your target.  This penalty is large enough that liquidity traders are always better off 
trading enough to hit their target, even if they must buy at very high prices or sell at very 
low prices to do so.  
 
Converting Laboratory Dollars into US Dollars. 
Laboratory winnings, as described above, will be converted into US$ according to the 
formula 
 
US$ Payment = (Net Gain/Loss in Laboratory $ + Adjustment) x Exchange Rate. 
 
You are guaranteed a minimum payment of US$10. 
 
You will not learn the exact adjustment or exchange rates. However, we will tell you that 
the exchange rate is positive, meaning that the more laboratory dollars you win, or the 
fewer you lose, the more $US you take home. The parameters are set so that the average 
winnings will be approximately $25, so that no one has an advantage or disadvantage.  
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How to use the Trading Interface (Order Entry Graphs) 
 
Two ways to BUY: 
• Enter a Bid:  Left-Click a price on the right side of the BIDS graph places an 
order in the order book.  You will buy a share at that price is someone else clicks 
the “Sell 1” button when you have the highest bid in the book. 
• Take an ask.  Click the “Buy 1” button to buy 1 share at the highest bid price in 
the book.  Your transaction will be executed immediately. 
 
Two ways to SELL: 
• Enter an Ask.  Left-Click a price on the right side of the ASKS graph places an 
order in the order book.  You will sell a share at that price is someone else clicks 
the “Buy 1” button when you have the lowest ask in the book. 
• Take a Bid.  Click the “Sell 1” button to sell 1 share at the highest bid price in the 
book.  Your transaction will be executed immediately. 
 
Delete a Bid or Ask:  Right Click on the right side of the BIDS or ASKS graph to 
remove an order at that price. 
 
Scrolling the graphs. 
Use the buttons between the order entry graphs to  
• Scroll higher in both graphs (up arrow) 
• Scroll lower in both graphs (down arrow) 
• Set the boundaries of both graphs to be equal (“RESET”) 
 
Reading the Information on the Right Side of the Screen 
Information about YOUR trades:   
• # of Buys indicates the number of times you bought a share, whether by taking 
someone’s ask or having them take one of your bids 
• The average price at which you bought is also reported 
• # of Sells indicates the number of times you sold a share, whether by taking 
someone’s bid or having them take one of your asks 
• The average price at which you sold  
Information about MARKET trades: 
• # of Buys indicates the number of times someone clicked the “Buy 1” button, 
taking the lowest ask; the average price of those trades is also reported 
• # of Sells indicates the number of times someone clicked the “Sell 1” button, 
taking the highest bid;  the average price of those trades is also reported 
 
 
